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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MINH NGOC HA, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 970746-CA 
Priority No. 2 
The primary issue on appeal here concerns plain error, where 
the trial court failed to comply with Rule 3-306, Utah Code Jud. 
Admin., in that it allowed an unqualified person, Tarn Huynh 
(Huynh), to translate testimony at trial for defense witness Tran 
Nguyen (Nguyen). Resolution of that issue hinges on prejudice. 
Specifically, at trial, defense counsel argued to the jury 
that defense witnesses, including Nguyen, would provide testimony 
refuting the state's claim that Defendant Minh Ha ("Ha") 
committed aggravated assault and assault at a dance club on May 
19, 1996. Nguyen's translated testimony did not specifically 
support defense counsel's argument. Her testimony was provided 
through Huynh, who was not qualified to translate the Vietnamese 
language. It is impossible to know whether Nguyen's testimony 
properly translated through a qualified interpreter would have 
been consistent with counsel's representations in argument and 
more favorable to Ha, since there was no way to know whether 
defects existed in the translation. However, if Nguyen's 
testimony, properly translated, had been consistent with defense 
counsel's representations, the jury would have been required to 
weigh Nguyen's testimony against evidence presented in the 
state's case. The possibility exists that the jury would have 
decided the case differently and in Ha's favor. 
In response to the primary issue on appeal, the state has 
identified three state witnesses who provided eyewitness 
identification of Ha as the attacker at the dance club. (See 
State's Brief ("S.B.") at 7.) Hanna Kim identified Ha from a 
photo line-up, at the preliminary hearing, and at trial (S.B. at 
7); Tai Luu identified Ha and a second person from a photo array 
as the possible assailant, and he identified Ha at the 
preliminary hearing and at trial; and witness Vu Tran testified 
that he saw Ha at the scene of the crime, but did not witness the 
attack. (Id.) 
While sufficient evidence may have existed to support the 
verdict in this matter, the sufficiency analysis is not 
applicable when considering whether, absent the Rule 3-306 error, 
there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome in 
the case. State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1121-22 (Utah 1989) . 
Rather, this Court must determine whether the violations under 
Rule 3-3 06 tainted the process, requiring a new trial.1 
1
 Ha provided a prejudice analysis under both the 
"reasonable-likelihood" standard and the constitutional, 
reasonable-doubt standard in his opening brief on appeal. (See 
Opening Brief of Appellant at 16-22 and note 2.) The state has 
argued that "no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome 
exists" in this case. Although the state has not addressed 
application of the constitutional, reasonable-doubt standard, Ha 
maintains that it applies to the first issue on appeal. (Id.) Ha 
has shown prejudice under both standards. Nevertheless, he urges 
(continued...) 
2 
Here, the jury was required to resolve reliability issues 
surrounding the state's case. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488-
489 (Utah 1986) (many factors must be considered in determining 
reliability of eyewitness identification testimony). The jury may 
have determined that it was too dark or confusing for 
eyewitnesses to make a proper identification, and that Nguyen's 
testimony properly translated supported defendant's case. Where 
prejudice can be shown, Ha is entitled to a new trial. The facts 
and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and 
record. 
POINT I. RULE 3-306 IS PLAIN IN THAT IT REQUIRES THE TRIAL 
JUDGE TO MAKE CERTAIN INQUIRIES BEFORE ALLOWING A PERSON TO 
SERVE AS TRANSLATOR IN A CASE, 
A. THE INVITED-ERROR DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE 
TRIAL COURT WAS REQUIRED TO TAKE A WAIVER PERSONALLY FROM 
DEFENDANT BEFORE PROCEEDING WITHOUT A PROPER INTERPRETER, 
AND/OR DEFENSE COUNSEL'S CONDUCT DID NOT ABSOLVE THE TRIAL 
COURT OF ITS DUTIES. 
The state claims Ha cannot assert error with respect to the 
trial judge's failure to comply with Rule 3-3 06 in allowing Huynh 
to serve as translator in this matter because Ha's counsel 
"offered Huynh to the court as his interpreter of choice." (S.B. 
at 11.) The state is incorrect. With respect to this matter, 
trial counsel's conduct was irrelevant for several reasons. 
1. Utah Case Law Provides that a Defendant Must Personally 
Waive the Right to an Interpreter. 
An "interpreter" under Utah law is an officer of the court 
(...continued) 
this Court to apply the reasonable-doubt prejudice standard 
identified in the opening brief. 
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who has demonstrated a high level of ability in translating 
testimony from a foreign language to English. See Utah Code of 
Professional Responsibility for Court Interpreters, Introduction 
and Canon 3, comment. Rule 3-306 recognizes three types of 
"interpreters" for use during court proceedings: a "certified 
interpreter", Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306(6)(A) (1999); a 
"qualified interpreter," id. at 3-306(6) (B) ; or a "non-qualified 
interpreter", id. at 3-306(6) (C) . To be an "interpreter" at any 
level, certain showings must be made. The record here fails to 
support that Huynh met the requirements under any of those 
provisions. Thus, under Utah law, Ha essentially proceeded 
without an interpreter in presenting portions of his case to the 
jury. That is tantamount to foregoing an interpreter. 
According to Utah case law, a defendant has certain rights 
that may only be waived by him. They are personal rights. Thus, 
counsel's actions may not serve to waive defendant's rights or 
require defendant to forego them. See State v. Gibbons, 74 0 P.2d 
1309, 1313 (Utah 1987) (counsel's representations are 
inconsequential in context of plea); State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 
1332, 1335 (Utah App. 1989) (specific inquiry must be made of 
defendant with regard to certain personal rights). 
The right to an interpreter is a right that requires 
personal waiver by a non-English speaking defendant before he may 
be required to forego an interpreter under the law. The Utah 
Supreme Court has specified as much. "[A] personal waiver by the 
defendant" is necessary where defendant is waiving the right to 
trial, which is waived by a plea; the right to be present during 
4 
trial; and the right to an interpreter, among other things. State 
v. Butterfield, 784 P.2d 153, 156 (Utah 1989) (citing People v. 
Mata Aquilar, 677 P.2d 1198, 1204, 200 Cal. Rptr. 908, 914-15 
(1984)); (Brief of Appellant at 12-13). Since the Utah Supreme 
Court has recognized that a trial court must take a waiver 
personally from defendant before proceeding in a matter without 
an appropriate interpreter under the law, trial counsel's conduct 
is irrelevant. Thus, the invited-error doctrine is inapplicable. 
2. Rule 3-306 Plainly Requires the Trial Judge to Take a 
Waiver from Defendant Before Proceeding with the Matter 
Without a Proper Interpreter. 
The plain language of Rule 3-306 requires the trial court to 
take a personal waiver from defendant before proceeding without 
the services of an interpreter under the rule. A person may waive 
the right to such services under the rule only when, 
(i) the waiver is approved by the appointing authority after 
explaining on the record to the non-English speaking person 
through an interpreter the nature and effect of the waiver; 
(ii) the appointing authority determines on the record that 
the waiver has been made knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily; and 
(iii) the non-English speaking person has been afforded the 
opportunity to consult with his or her attorney. 
Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306(7). 
Here, the trial court failed to take a knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary waiver from Ha before allowing Huynh to translate 
testimony when he did not meet the criteria for any level of 
interpreter under the rule. (See R. 193:162-63.) That is, after 
the court learned that Huynh was not certified, see Utah Code 
Jud. Admin. Rule 3-306(6) (A) (certification requirements), the 
court did not determine whether Huynh was qualified under the 
5 
rule, see id. at (6)(B) (qualification requirements), or non-
qualified under the rule, see id. at (6)(C) (non-qualification 
requirements). That is the equivalent of allowing the matter to 
proceed with no translator under the rule. The court was not 
excused from taking a waiver from Ha before proceeding without an 
interpreter as provided by the rule. The trial court erred. 
Defense counsel's conduct was irrelevant. 
3. Defense Counsel's Conduct Did Not Absolve the Trial 
Judge of his Duty to Engage in One of Three Possible 
Inquiries Before Proceeding with the Matter. 
Even if counsel "offered Huynh to the court as his 
interpreter of choice" (S.B. at 11), that did not absolve the 
trial judge of his duties under the rule. Rule 3-306 "shall" 
apply to legal proceedings. Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-3 06. 
Thus, pursuant to the rule, the judge had three choices with 
respect to how he may proceed with the matter. According to Rule 
3-306, if a certified interpreter is not available to translate 
proceedings, the appointing authority may (1) appoint a qualified 
interpreter, (2) use a non-qualified interpreter to translate 
where appropriate, or (3) take a waiver from defendant with 
respect to interpreters and allow the matter to proceed. Utah 
Code Jud. Admin. 3-306(6)(B), (6)(C), (7); see Point I.A.2., 
supra. Each choice required the judge to make an inquiry with 
regard to the matter. The court violated the rule by failing to 
make any appropriate inquiry. 
Specifically, under subparagraph (6)(B) the judge could have 
determined whether Huynh was qualified to translate. That process 
required the judge to do the following: 
6 
(ii) Procedure for appointment. Before appointing a 
qualified interpreter, the appointing authority [] shall: 
(a) evaluate the totality of the circumstances including the 
gravity of the judicial proceeding and the potential penalty 
or consequence to the accused person involved, 
(b) qualify the prospective interpreter by asking questions 
as to the following matters in an effort to determine 
whether the interpreter has a minimum level of 
qualification: 
(1) whether the prospective interpreter appears to have 
adequate language skills, knowledge of interpreting 
techniques and familiarity with interpreting in a court or 
administrative hearing setting; and 
(2) whether the prospective interpreter has read, under-
stands, and agrees to comply with the code of professional 
responsibility for court interpreters set forth in appendix 
H. 
Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306(6) (B) (ii); (a copy of Appendix H is 
attached to Ha's opening Brief of Appellant as Addendum C.) The 
state acknowledges that "[a]n evaluation of the totality of the 
circumstances of the case does not expressly appear on the 
record," as required by subpart (6)(B)(ii)(a). (S.B. at 16.) 
Such an evaluation would have been appropriate. Ha was facing a 
second degree felony offense, which provides for a prison 
sentence of 1 to 15 years, and three state witnesses had 
identified him as the assailant. Circumstances were grave for Ha. 
The state also admits that the court engaged in limited 
questioning with regard to subpart (6)(B)(ii)(b). In response to 
the court's question as to whether Huynh was certified, Huynh 
stated: "Actually, we don't have such vocation in Utah, but I do 
perform vocation in front of the Industrial Commission." (R. 
193:162.) The court did not follow up on that representation or 
consider it responsive. The court stated, "I mean through the 
administrative office of the courts. But apparently not." (Id.) 
That limited inquiry is insufficient to constitute 
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"qualification." Even if the court had determined through that 
dialogue that Huynh appeared to have "adequate language skills, 
knowledge of interpreting techniques and familiarity with 
interpreting in a court or administrative hearing setting", the 
court failed to determine whether Huynh "has read, understands, 
and agrees to comply with the code of professional responsibility 
for court interpreters set forth in appendix H." Utah Code Jud. 
Admin. 3-306 (6) (B) (ii) (b) (1) and (2). 
The reference to Appendix H contemplates assessing whether 
the prospective interpreter will provide complete, accurate 
translation without alteration, omissions, etc.; make accurate 
representations about his training; provide impartiality and 
unbiased services; ensure confidentiality and the exercise of the 
proper amount of discretion in connection with discussing court 
matters; and comply with reporting requirements regarding the 
interpreter's competence and abilities, and his efforts in 
complying with the law and the code. See Appendix H, a copy of 
which is attached to the Brief of Appellant as Addendum C. None 
of those matters were discussed even in a general sense, and 
there was no reference made by the trial court to the code of 
professional responsibility. (See R. 193:162-63.) 
The state asserts that Huynh provided an oath to the court 
"swearing to abide by the code" (S.B. at 17) and that his service 
in the Industrial Commission supports that he adhered to the code 
of professional responsibility for court interpreters. That 
assertion is not supported by the record. (See 193:162-63.) 
Huynh has not been included on the list of qualified interpreters 
8 
maintained by the Administrative Office of the Courts. See Utah 
Code Jud. Admin. 3-306(6)(B)(iii) (qualification proceedings need 
not recur every time interpreter is used when name of interpreter 
is placed on list of qualified interpreters maintained in 
district).2 Perhaps his services in the Industrial Commission 
were limited because he did not qualify under the rules. 
Also, the oath in this matter cannot be sufficient to 
support qualification, particularly when the "oath" refers to a 
sworn statement that must be provided before every judicial 
proceeding, see Utah R. Evid. 604 (1998) (interpreter subject to 
administration of oath or affirmation to make a true 
translation), as opposed to the specific inquiry that occurs for 
qualification. Nothing about Huynh1s service with the Industrial 
Commission, or the oath supports that Huynh read, understood or 
would agree to abide by the code. (See R. 193:162-63.) The 
inquiry was plainly deficient. 
The state does not dispute that the trial court failed to 
make the appropriate determination with respect to proceeding 
with Huynh as translator under the provisions for "non-qualified" 
2
 While this Court is normally reluctant to take judicial 
notice of facts on appeal, see State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230, 236 
n. 7 (Utah App. 1998), the fact that Huynh did not appear on the 
list of qualified interpreters for this jurisdiction is capable 
of accurate and ready determination and appropriate for judicial 
notice. Utah R. Evid. 201(b)(2) (1999). The Administrative 
Office of the Courts maintains as a public record an available 
list of persons qualified to serve as interpreters in the Viet-
namese language. See Lehi Irrigation Co. v. Jones, 2 02 P.2d 8 92, 
895 (Utah 1949) (judicial notice may be taken of information in 
public records); Utah R. Evid. 803(8) (1999) (public records 
include information maintained by government offices pursuant to 
law). Huynh was not on the list, and there is no dispute with 
respect to that fact. See Brief of Appellee generally. 
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interpreters, Rule 3-306(6)(C), or in seeking whether Ha wished 
to proceed without an interpreter as provided by the Rule. See 
Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306(7); Point I.A.2., supra. Where 
the rule shall apply and requires the court to make certain 
inquiries, defense counsel's actions did not absolve the court of 
its duties. The invited-error doctrine is inapplicable here.3 
B. IN ADDRESSING THE MERITS OF HA'S CLAIM UNDER THE PLAIN-
ERROR DOCTRINE, THE STATE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE 
DID NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 3-306. 
1. The State Suggests Time Constraints Prevented the Court 
from Complying with the Rule; Yet the Rule Does Not Excuse 
Compliance for Such Reasons, and the Record Fails to Support 
the State fs Argument. 
The state admits the trial judge failed "to expressly comply 
on the record with each of the requirements of rule 3-3 06, Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration," in allowing Huynh to proceed as 
In support of the state's "invited-error" argument, the 
state relies on State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997), 
and State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah App. 1997). Those 
cases are distinguishable. There the attorneys did not object for 
strategical reasons to the prosecutor's improper statements in 
closing argument. Under those circumstances, the court is not 
required to obtain a "waiver" personally from defendant before 
proceeding with the matter. It is sufficient that counsel waived 
the objection for strategic reasons. Thus, if there was error in 
letting the statements in, the attorneys invited the error. 
Here, Rule 3-306 requires the court to engage in a certain 
inquiry concerning a prospective interpreter without regard for 
how the person is offered to the court. That is, if Huynh had 
appeared pursuant to the court's order, the court would have to 
determine whether Huynh was certified, qualified or met the 
requirements for a non-qualified interpreter before proceeding, 
and if he did not meet any requirements, the court would be 
required to take a waiver from defendant before proceeding 
without an interpreter as provided by the rule. If the state had 
offered Huynh as interpreter, the court would be required to go 
through the same process. The point is, the court had 
responsibilities without regard for who offered Huynh in this 
case. The rule does not excuse the court when counsel for the 
defense introduces the prospective interpreter. 
10 
an interpreter in this matter. (S.B. at 14.) However, the state 
claims the trial court was excused from complying with the rule 
because of the "timing with which defendant informed the court of 
the need for an interpreter for Ms. Nguyen." (S.B. at 15.) Coun-
sel for the defense informed the court of the need for a second 
interpreter on the second day of trial. (R. 193:162.) The state 
indicates that no other qualified or certified interpreter was 
reasonably available at that time. (S.B. at 15.) Yet, the record 
fails to support that determination since no inquiry whatsoever 
was made with respect to the matter. (See record generally.) 
Indeed, the court knew that Huynh was not qualified to be an 
interpreter; the court also knew the qualification/certification 
program was administered through the Administrative Office of the 
Courts. (R. 193:162.) With that knowledge, the court should have 
determined through the administrative office whether a qualified 
interpreter was reasonably available. See Utah Code Jud. Admin. 
3-306(4) (court administrative office manages certification 
program) and (6) (B) (iii) (court administrative office maintains 
list of qualified interpreters for use in court proceedings).4 
4
 The Administrative Office of the Courts is required to 
establish certification programs for interpreters in various 
languages. Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306(4) (A). According to in-
formation readily available to the public from that office, there 
is no certification program in Utah for persons interpreting in 
the Vietnamese language. This Court may take judicial notice of 
the fact that there are no certified interpreters for that lan-
guage in Utah. Utah R. Evid. 201(b)(2) (judicial notice may be 
taken of facts capable of accurate and ready determination); see 
Lehi Irrigation Co., 202 P.2d at 895 (judicial notice may be 
taken of information available in public records). Also, pursuant 
to Rule 3-306(6) (B) (iii) that office maintains a list of 
"qualified interpreters" who are available to translate. 
11 
In the alternative, the trial court should have determined 
through the straightforward inquiry set forth in Rule 3-3 06 
whether Huynh met the requirements for qualification or non-
qualification, or whether Ha intended to waive the right to have 
an interpreter under Rule 3-306(6)(A), (B), or (C) translate the 
testimony. See Point I.A.2. and 3., supra. 
The court's obligations under the rule are straightforward 
under each possible scenario. See Rule 3-306(6) (A) (proceeding 
with certified interpreter); (6)(B) (proceeding with qualified 
interpreter); (6)(C) (proceeding with non-qualified interpreter); 
(7) (waiving use of interpreter as set forth in rule). The 
process is simple and efficient. The record fails to support the 
determination that the judge was excused from complying with the 
rule because of time constraints. 
The state also asserts no error existed because "Huynh met 
the standard for appointment under subsection (B)(i)(b)." (S.B. 
at 15.) That provision states that if "a certification program 
[is] established under subparagraph (4), but no certified 
interpreter is reasonably available," the court may appoint a 
qualified interpreter to translate the matter. Utah Code Jud. 
Admin. 3-306(6)(B)(i)(b) and (4). The state seems to argue that 
Huynh "qualified" as an interpreter. As set forth above, the 
trial court failed to inquire into the matter. See Point I.A.3., 
supra. The judge asked only if Huynh was certified, to which 
Huynh stated there was no such "vocation in Utah," but that he 
served as an interpreter in front of the Industrial Commission. 
(R. 193:162.) Thus, the record fails to support that Huynh met 
12 
the standards for appointment as a qualified interpreter. The 
judge failed to comply with the rule. That constitutes error. 
2. The State Asserts the Error Was Not Obvious Because of 
Timing; Yet, Rule 3-306 Is Efficient and Straightforward. 
Once it was obvious to the trial judge that Huynh was not 
"certified," the judge was required to make specific inquiries 
under the rule, whether or not defense counsel acquiesced in the 
use of Huynh as translator. See Point I.A. and I.B.I., supra. 
The state again suggests that the timing of the matter 
excused the judge from complying with the rule, or that somehow 
defense counsel should have complied with the requirements of the 
rule. (S.B. at 19.) 
As set forth above, Rule 3-306 is a time-saving device that 
"secures the rights of persons who are unable to understand or 
communicate adequately in the English language when they are in-
volved in legal proceedings." Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306, 
Intent. The rule accommodates the trial court by setting forth 
the simple and specific inquiry that must be made with respect to 
the various levels of interpreters (certified, qualified, non-
qualified) , or waiver. Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306(6) and (7). 
If a certified interpreter is not available, the court may 
obtain the name of a qualified interpreter from a list maintained 
by the Administrative Office of the Courts, Utah Code Jud. Admin. 
3-306(6)(B)(iii), without going through the qualification 
requirements in connection with every court proceeding. Utah Code 
Jud. Admin. 3-306(6)(B). The rule ensures a defendant's rights 
and is efficient. If a qualified interpreter is not available, 
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the inquiries for non-qualified interpreters or waiver are plain 
and set forth in the rule. The rule expedites the process. 
The state also suggests that the qualified interpreter, Tony 
Ngo, was available to alert the court to any problems with the 
translation. (S.B. at 18.) If the trial court had appointed Ngo 
to serve in such a capacity, that may have ameliorated problems 
in translation. Indeed, Ha indicated in his opening Brief of 
Appellant that such a solution may have been appropriate. (Brief 
of Appellant at 19.) Yet in this case, the judge failed to 
employ any safeguards to ensure an accurate translation. (See R. 
193:162-63.) The trial court did not ask Ngo or Huynh to alert 
the court to difficulties in translating and it was not expected 
that either person would do so. See State v. Fung, 907 P. 2d 
1192, 1194 (Utah App. 1995) (court instructed interpreter to 
alert court to difficulties in translating, thereby employing 
safeguards in translation). The state's suggestion that the 
court took measures to otherwise ensure an accurate translation 
are not supported by the record. 
3 - The State Asserts Ha's Prejudice Analysis Fails Because 
He Is Unable to Identify Defects in the Translation; Since 
There Is No Way to Assess the Translation, It Is Impossible 
to Prove a Negative Here. 
This case presents a unique situation in that the outcome 
without the error is unknown. With a proper interpreter, Nguyen's 
translated testimony may have been consistent with the defense's 
argument that Ha was home at the time of the attack. (See R. 
193:133 (defense counsel's opening remarks).) 
For example, with respect to questions concerning the night 
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of the attack, May 19, 1996, Nguyen's translated testimony was 
unclear and confusing. Defense counsel asked her simply if she 
"remember[ed] that day" in particular. (R. 193:166.) The 
translated answer was: "I can't remember exactly because usually 
my friend or my brother went out during May every year." (Id.) 
The answer may have related to the fishing trip Ha took every 
year in May or June, and was not particularly responsive to the 
question. (See R. 193:140 (Ha traveled to Texas every year in 
May or June to fish).) Nevertheless, it caused defense counsel to 
redirect his line of questioning, which may not have been 
necessary. If a proper interpreter had been used, the answers may 
have supported the defendant's case and prompted further 
questions on that particular matter. 
When the prosecutor asked if Nguyen had any reason to 
remember what Ha was doing during the month of May 1996, Nguyen 
again was not responsive to the question. She stated: "He didn't 
do anything." (R. 193:170.) When the prosecutor asked his 
question again, "But you did not have any reason to remember what 
he was doing in May of 1996," she stated: "Yes, but a couple of 
months later, I hear Jon, Minh friend, told me that people 
suspect Minh in that incident." (Id.) 
For whatever reason, Nguyen's answers focused on what she 
had heard about the incident months later, rather than what she 
remembered or knew with respect to the night at issue. It is 
unclear why her answers were so unresponsive. 
With a proper interpreter, the matter may have revealed that 
Ha was not at the club at the time of the attack. (See R. 
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193:133 (defense counsel argued that evidence would support that 
fact) .) Such information would have required the jury to weigh 
Nguyen's testimony and credibility against that of the state 
witnesses who provided eyewitness-identification testimony that 
was formed under stressful, difficult circumstances. The jury 
may have found that Nguyen was credible, and that it was too dark 
after midnight for the three eyewitnesses to accurately identify 
the assailant. (R. 193:90-91; 193:97 (crime occurred around 
closing time, which was 1:00 or 1:30 a.m.)); Long, 721 P.2d at 
488-495 (darkness as well as other factors may make eyewitness 
identification unreliable). 
Because the judge chose not to employ safeguards, there is 
no way to know what would have happened. Upon learning that Huynh 
was not qualified to interpret, the trial court was in the best 
position to minimize potential problems in the proceedings, and 
impose appropriate safeguards. The trial court failed to do so. 
Since the court did not determine whether Huynh met the require-
ments of a qualified or non-qualified interpreter (which would 
have availed the proceedings of the presumption of validity (see 
Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306(3) (certified and qualified inter-
preters under the law are required to comply with code); Salt 
Lake City v. Emerson, 861 P.2d 443, 447 (Utah App. 1993) (compli-
ance with law creates presumption of validity, while failure to 
comply with law means that validity may not be presumed))), and 
did not require that either Ngo or Huynh alert the court to 
difficulties in translating, it is impossible to know whether 
problems existed. That does not mean there were no problems. 
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The state asserts that "defendant [was] in the best position 
on appeal to identify any irregularity or deficiency in the 
interpretation which might arguably have harmed him." (S.B. at 
19.) Ha has identified how he was harmed by the error. (See 
Brief of Appellant at 16-22; and Reply Brief at 1-3, 15-17.) To 
the extent the state suggests that Ha was able to understand the 
translation from Vietnamese to English, the state is mistaken. 
Ha does not speak English. While Ha would have directly 
understood Nguyen's testimony, he would have no way of knowing 
during the trial what Huynh represented to the jury with respect 
to Nguyen's testimony, and what information the attorneys relied 
on to formulate their questions to Nguyen. This case should be 
reversed for a new trial. 
POINT II. THE STATE ACKNOWLEDGES THE ERROR OF THE 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT RAISED ON APPEAL. 
The state claims Ha is challenging statements made by the 
prosecutor during both his initial closing argument and during 
the prosecutor's surrebuttal or "rebuttal" in closing. (S.B. at 
23.) That is not correct. Ha specifically recognized that with 
respect to comments made during the prosecutor's initial closing 
argument, defense counsel apparently made a strategical decision 
not to object to the comments. "[C] ounsel for the defense in 
closing argument pointed out that the earlier statements were 
insupportable." (Brief of Appellant at 25.) "After the prosecutor 
initially made the improper statements, defense counsel responded 
to them in his closing." (Id. at 25-26 (citing to State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1224-25 (Utah 1993) (supreme court recognized that 
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such strategy serves to ameliorate the harmful effects of earlier 
statements).) 
Ha has not challenged on appeal the initial statements made 
by the prosecutor during closing argument. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1224-25 (where prosecutor makes improper remarks during initial 
closing argument and defense counsel corrects those remarks in 
rebuttal, harmful effects of improper remarks are ameliorated). 
The issue on appeal relates only to the prosecutor's surrebuttal 
comments. (See Brief of Appellant at Point II.) 
With regard to the prosecutor's surrebuttal remarks, the 
state has acknowledged that to the extent the prosecutor relied 
on statistical information that was not supported by the record, 
and/or asked the jury to believe that "defendant was the only 
person in existence with this tattoo on his forehead," that would 
be improper. (See S.B. at 2 6.) In surrebuttal the prosecutor 
made improper representations. Specifically, the prosecutor 
represented as a matter of fact that "there isn't going to be 
anyone but the defendant" in this society who had a tattoo in the 
middle of his forehead. (R. at 193:199 (prosecutor specified he 
was not talking about possibilities but facts in evidence).) 
Thus, according to the state, where the prosecutor made that 
statement as fact, "it could constitute error." (S.B. at 29.)5 
5
 The prosecutor back-tracked on his earlier statement that 
Ha's weight, height and the tattoo compelled the jury to find 
that he was the assailant. (Compare R. 193:183 to 193:199.) 
Rather, the prosecutor suggested that even if the witnesses were 
wrong about other factors, including height and weight, the 
tattoo supported the conviction. That is a more troubling 
statement, since any disparities in the witnesses' descriptions 
(continued...) 
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The prosecutor represented that his surrebuttal remarks were 
supported by the evidence, where they were not. The state does 
not deny that the remarks during surrebuttal constituted error 
under the plain-error analysis. 
Next, the state seems to claim that the error was not 
obvious because the insupportable statistical representations 
were referenced several times. (S.B. at 29.) Indeed, that fact 
highlights the obviousness of the error. That is, where the 
prosecutor initially claimed in front of the judge and jury that 
statistical conclusions may be reached where no evidence had been 
presented (R. 193:183), the judge would have realized that 
representation was incorrect. When defense counsel pointed out 
in rebuttal that the prosecutor's initial statement was not 
supported by the evidence, again the judge would have realized 
the problem with the prosecutor's remarks in that regard. (R. 
193:188, 195-96.) When the prosecutor finally came back in 
surrebuttal to reassert unequivocally as a matter of fact and 
evidence that Ha was the only person in society with a tattoo in 
the middle of his forehead (R. 193:199), the error was obvious. 
Finally, with regard to the prejudice analysis, the state 
claims Ha was not harmed by the obvious error since "very 
compelling" evidence was presented against him at trial. (S.B. 
at 29-30.) In support of that assertion, the state engages in a 
sufficiency analysis and identifies the evidence presented 
(...continued) 
with respect to other factors would set Ha apart from other 
persons who surely exist in society with a tattoo in the middle 
of their foreheads. 
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through the state's three witnesses. To begin, the sufficiency 
analysis is inapplicable in considering prejudice. Rather, the 
prejudice analysis considers whether such overwhelming and 
cumulative evidence exists to render the error harmless. See, 
Mitchell, 779 P.2d at 1121-22. As set forth in Ha' s opening 
Brief of Appellant, the prosecutor recognized that the state's 
witnesses, together and separately, presented reliability 
concerns. (R. 193:181 (in closing argument, prosecutor 
recognized that identification was important issue to be 
determined by jury).) 
Each witness identified Ha as the assailant. However, Luu 
also identified another person as the attacker (R. 193:68-69, 77-
78) , Kim acknowledged it was late at night and she was under 
great stress when she observed the assailant (R.193:88, 97, 111), 
and Tran admitted he did not witness the attack. (R. 193:121.) 
In addition, while Luu and Kim identified Ha from a photo-array, 
he was the only person in the array with a tattoo in the middle 
of his forehead. (R. 193:63, 97, Exhibits 5 and 6.) Also, while 
all three witnesses testified they witnessed Ha at the dance club 
on May 19, 1996, it is important to note that Ha did not deny 
that fact. (See R. 193:133 (defense counsel admits Ha was at the 
club on May 19, 1996, but he returned home before the attack).) 
It is possible that all three witnesses saw him that evening 
at the club and were fascinated or struck by the tattoo in the 
middle of his forehead. Then later, under stressful circum-
stances when it became important to recall features about someone 
from that evening, the tattoo emerged as a compelling and 
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memorable factor - not necessarily because the attacker had such 
a tattoo, but because they were so struck by seeing that feature 
earlier and were unable to distinguish or separate the circum-
stances under the tension of the moment. The possibility of such 
cross-recollection is contemplated by the instruction provided to 
the jury concerning the reliability of eyewitness identifica-
tions. (R. 90-92.) Those circumstances support harm. The error 
requires reversal. 
POINT III. THE STATE HAS IDENTIFIED THE VERY REASONS WHY 
DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT AND TO 
SEEK A CURATIVE INSTRUCTION IN THE FACE OF THE PROSECUTORS 
IMPROPER REMARKS. 
The state claims trial counsel's failure to object to the 
improper statements set forth in point II, above, during the 
state's surrebuttal was a result of "reasonable trial strategy." 
(S.B. at 34.) The state claims upon recognizing that the 
surrebuttal comments were improper, defense counsel may not have 
objected "in [the] hopes that the prosecutor's statement that no 
one would have the same tattoo would reinforce to the jury what 
defense counsel had argued in his earlier closing remarks: the 
prosecutor was asking the jury to rely on probabilities and 
possibilities unsupported by the evidence and not amounting to 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt." (S.B. at 34.) 
The state has identified the very reason why defense counsel 
was deficient in failing to object to the remarks. Such a "hope" 
would have been realized if defense counsel had reinforced to the 
jury through a proper objection and a request for a curative 
instruction that the prosecutor's statements were insupportable, 
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speculative, and improper. Also, because the prosecutor 
represented that the improper surrebuttal remarks were based in 
the record, the need for an objection and curative instruction to 
set the record straight was more apparent. 
The state also claims that defense counsel may have been 
reluctant to raise an objection because an objection may have 
left the jury with the impression that the prosecutor's earlier, 
initial remarks in closing were proper. Yet, as set forth above 
(Point II, supra), and in the opening Brief of Appellant at 
Points II and III, such a fear would have been unreasonable. The 
defense corrected the initial improper statements; an objection 
to the surrebuttal remarks would have reinforced to the jury that 
the improper statements were not based in fact and not 
appropriate to consider. The matters identified by the state 
again highlight the fact that counsel's failure to object to the 
statements amounted to deficient performance. There was no rea-
sonable basis in the record for allowing the improper surrebuttal 
remarks to go to the jury without objection and a curative 
instruction, particularly where defense counsel had already 
challenged similar remarks as insupportable. (R. 193:195-96.) 
With respect to the issue of prejudice, the state claims 
there is none, and relies on its analysis set forth in connection 
with the plain-error analysis. (See Point II, supra for plain-
error analysis.) Therefore, Ha refers the Court to the prejudice 
identified in Point III of the opening Brief of Appellant, and 
Point II of this brief and in the opening brief. Where Ha has 
established prejudice, he is entitled to a new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ha maintains that the each error in this case constituted 
reversible error where prejudice has been established. In the 
event this Court finds that the errors standing alone are not 
reversible, the cumulative error doctrine is relevant and 
warrants reversal of the matter, as set forth in the opening 
Brief of Appellant. See Point IV, Brief of Appellant; but cf. 
State v. Cardall, Case No. 970433, Slip op. at 7 (Utah May 21, 
1999) ("We fail to see how two nonprejudicial incidents can 
combine to form the requisite prejudice to establish that 
[defendant] should have been granted a mistrial. Cumulative 
error occurr v' *"* ^ <* defendant:" & juigiit to a fair trial ic 
prejudiced by a number of errors"). The facts and legal arguments 
are adequately presented in the briefs and record. 
SUBMITTED THIS J}S*±t. day of June, 1999. 
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